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Abstract Cooperative transmissions have received re-
cent attention and research papers have demonstrated
their benefits for wireless networks. Such benefits in-
clude improving the reliability of links through diver-
sity and/or increasing the reach of a link compared to
a single transmitter transmitting to a single receiver
(single-input single-output or SISO). In one form of
cooperative transmissions, multiple nodes can act as
virtual antenna elements and provide diversity gain
or range improvement using space-time coding. In a
multi-hop ad hoc or sensor network, a source node can
make use of its neighbors as relays with itself to reach
an intermediate node with greater reliability or at a
larger distance than otherwise possible. The intermedi-
ate node will use its neighbors in a similar manner and
this process continues till the destination is reached.
Thus, for the same reliability of a link as SISO, the
number of hops between a source and destination may
be reduced using cooperative transmissions as each hop
spans a larger distance. However, the presence of ma-
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licious or compromised nodes in the network impacts
the benefits obtained with cooperative transmissions.
Using more relays can increase the reach of a link, but
if one or more relays are malicious, the transmission
may fail. However, the relationships between the number
of relays, the number of hops, and success probabilities
are not trivial to determine. In this paper, we analyze
this problem to understand the conditions under which
cooperative transmissions fare better or worse than
SISO transmissions. We take into consideration addi-
tional parameters such as the path-loss exponent and
provide a framework that allows us to evaluate the
conditions when cooperative transmissions are better
than SISO transmissions. This analysis provides insights
that can be employed before resorting to simulations or
experimentation.
Keywords cooperative communications · security ·
reliability
1 Introduction
Cooperative transmissions or cooperative diversity is
a relatively new physical layer approach which helps
to achieve performance gains similar to multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) enabled transmissions
in wireless networks compared to traditional single-
input single-output (SISO) links. With cooperative
transmissions, several nodes with single antennas form
what can be considered as a virtual antenna array to
assist each other with the transmission of messages.
When a virtual antenna array is created only for trans-
mitting to a single receiving node, the approach is called
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virtual multiple-input single-output (vMISO) transmis-
sions [1]. The way vMISO works is as follows. A coop-
erative transmission is initiated by a source node multi-
casting (or broadcasting) a message to a number of
cooperating relay nodes, which then send the message
to the destination node (together with the source node)
using techniques such as space-time coding. The desti-
nation node combines the signals from the source and
relays appropriately to decode the message.
Cooperative transmissions exploit a fundamental
feature of the wireless medium: the ability to achieve di-
versity through independent channels created between
the multiple transmitters and the receiver, because
these channels are likely to fade independently. In the
case of SISO transmissions, the channel has a certain
probability of being in fade. With vMISO, unless all
of the multiple independent channels are in fade, the
information in the signal has a good chance of being re-
covered at the receiver. The resulting advantages (that
have been widely studied previously at the physical
layer—see for example [2]) are a better bit-error rate
(BER) for a given transmission rate and/or a longer
transmission range for a given BER while consuming
the same amount of transmission power compared to
non-cooperative transmissions. These advantages can
also provide energy efficient routing and a longer life-
time in the case of sensor networks. We will use cooper-
ative transmissions and vMISO interchangeably in this
paper.
Unfortunately, from a security point of view, cooper-
ative transmissions suffer from drawbacks. The benefits
of cooperative transmissions arise from the fact that
with more relay nodes, a higher order of diversity can
be achieved, thus improving the BER and/or range.
However, at the same time, security threats increase
with the involvement of additional parties to the com-
munication since they may all not be honest and trust-
worthy nodes. For example, even if one of the nodes
that form the virtual antenna array is malicious, it can
disrupt the transmission, or it can transmit garbled
symbols in order to both corrupt the transmission and
perhaps drain the batteries of honest nodes.
The relationships between the number of relays, the
number of malicious nodes, the number of hops, and
delivery success probabilities are not trivial to determine
and also depend on parameters such as the path-loss
exponent. In this paper, we develop an analytical frame-
work for evaluating when cooperative transmissions
may be more beneficial than SISO transmissions in
sensor networks with a mix of honest and malicious
and/or compromised nodes. For this evaluation, we
employ as the performance metric, the probability of
successful reception of packets. While this framework
could be applied to any multi-hop wireless network,
we will consider here a sensor network with multi-
hop transmissions where key pre-distribution schemes
may be employed for additional security [3]. Key pre-
distribution allows pairs of sensor nodes to establish
secure communications if they share a key. However,
with key pre-distribution, not all pairs of sensor nodes
share a key, although many pairs do. Thus, it is very
likely that each SISO link on a route from a source
to the destination is secure when there are no compro-
mised nodes. The presence of compromised nodes may
however disrupt communications along a path from the
source to the destination and data packets may not suc-
cessfully reach the destination. As the number of hops
to the destination increases, the chance of a successful
reception at the destination drops. When cooperative
transmissions are employed with vMISO, for the same
link reliability, the number of hops to the destination
may be reduced making it more likely that the packet
is successfully received at the destination (see Fig. 1).
The reduction in the number of hops increases as the
number of cooperating nodes increases. This however
does not come freely in a network with a mix of honest
and malicious nodes. Since every pair of sensor nodes
may not share a key, even without compromised nodes
in the network, a vMISO transmission may potentially
accept cooperation from a node that is not necessarily
honest (i.e., from nodes that may not share keys with
the transmitting node). Additionally, if some of the
nodes that share keys are compromised, in such cases,
vMISO may fare worse than longer SISO links.
It is not easy or straightforward to predict what
circumstances are better for vMISO or SISO for vari-
ous reasons. First, the diversity benefits increase with
the number of cooperating relays, but the relation is
non-linear and varies with the environment and the
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Example of a SISO route and a vMISO route between a
source and destination node
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requirements placed on reliability. Second, the chance
of involvement of malicious or compromised nodes
depends on their number in the network and also
the distance between the source node and destination
node. Third, various key pre-distribution schemes have
different probabilities of sharing secret keys with neigh-
bors that may act as relays which changes the ability
of a transmitting node to select trusted cooperating
neighbors. Finally, malicious nodes may also not always
disrupt transmissions to avoid quick detection. The
contribution of this paper is an analytical framework
that includes these parameters so that it is possible to
evaluate the boundaries of where vMISO or SISO fare
better. We do however make simplifying assumptions
(e.g., we do not very rigorously account for node den-
sity, but make approximations). Our analysis allowed
us to determine a fairly general condition where vMISO
has a better probability of successfully delivering a
packet than SISO as nKv < Ks, where n is the num-
ber of cooperating nodes that is used at each hop of
a multi-hop vMISO route, and Kv and Ks are the
number of hops required to reach a destination from
the source with vMISO and SISO, respectively. This
condition holds when the number of honest nodes in
the neighborhood of a node is much higher than n. As
expected, our analysis shows that while using vMISO,
a small n is preferable. This analysis provides insights
that can be employed before resorting to simulations
or experimentation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present some background and related work
on cooperative transmissions, some possible attacks
against cooperative transmissions, and a primer on key
pre-distribution. Section 3 describes the framework for
analyzing the probability of successfully receiving a
packet at the destination with SISO and vMISO, with
and without the use of shared keys. Section 4 presents
the results obtained from the analysis. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper and outlines its limitations.
2 Background and related work
In this section we briefly describe the background ma-
terial needed for the rest of this paper and some related
work. We do not look at an exhaustive review of the
literature on cooperative diversity for which we refer
to [1, 2, 4]. We however look at the various ways in
which attacks can disrupt cooperative transmissions as
there is no work that to our knowledge provides a
comprehensive discussion of the possibilities.
2.1 Cooperative transmissions
Cooperative transmissions can improve the quality or
range of a link by creating virtual antenna arrays com-
prised of a source and some of its neighbors. In a
vMISO system, a cluster of cooperating nodes emulate
the antenna array of a real multiple-input single-output
(MISO) system [1]. There is a single head node or
source in this cluster that is the originator or source
of data, and there are multiple cooperating nodes each
of which act as a transmitter antenna in an antenna
array. Unlike real MISO systems, the antennas are
not co-located in vMISO systems. Consequently, the
source first broadcasts or multicasts its packet to the
neighboring nodes that make up the eventual relays.
After the relays receive the data, the source and the
cooperating relays all then simultaneously transmit the
packet to the receiver(s). In the approach we consider
here, once all nodes in the cluster have the original data,
they will encode data using an appropriate space-time
block code (STBC) [5], and simultaneously transmit the
coded block to a receiver.
Figure 1 shows examples of SISO and vMISO routes
between a source S and a destination D to illustrate the
potential benefits (this is for illustration and does not
use actual parameters). The SISO route is 4 hops long
and goes through intermediate nodes f1, f2, f3. The
vMISO route is two hops long, but each hop has three
transmitters (S, R1, R2 for the first hop and f2, R3, R4
along the second hop). The assumptions underlying the
benefits from vMISO are that each individual link (e.g.,
S to f2 or R2 to f2) in Fig. 1 is independently fading.
Thus, the vMISO link is more reliable because of the
inherent diversity.
There are several physical layer related issues that
we do not elaborate upon here. It is possible to over-
come these challenges using physical layer techniques
[1] that are described in many of the related physical
layer research papers. For example, in order to leverage
the benefits of space-diversity, data should be encoded
using a space time block code. An STBC with code
rate rn = k/kn, rn ≤ 1, is defined by a transmission
matrix of size kn × n, where n is the number of (virtual)
transmitter antenna elements and kn is the number of
time units involved in the transmission of k symbols
[5]. The simplest STBC is the Alamouti code, which
has unit rate [6], n = 2 co-located antennas or n = 2
cooperating relays, and transmitting two symbols every
two time units. STBCs suitable for higher numbers of
transmitter antennas or cooperating relays have also
been developed (see for e.g., [7]) but some may have
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lower code rates which we ignore in this paper. In
order to decode the transmitted block successfully, the
receiver node requires channel state information (CSI)
between itself and each of the transmitting nodes. CSI
is obtained by using pilot tones transmitted by each
node prior to the data transmission. Some loose syn-
chronization between S, R1 and R2 is necessary but
the impact of different node locations (as against co-
located antennas) has been shown to be minimal [1].
The individual links are typically assumed to be flat-
fading (which is the assumption made in this paper)
although frequency selective fading may be combatted
as well.
Further, in this paper, we ignore the protocols and
overhead associated with identifying nodes such as
R1 and R2 at every link as this has been previously
considered in other work and is also not the focus of
this paper. For instance, in [1] a primary SISO route
is first created and then this primary route is used to
create a vMISO route. In [2], a greedy geographical
routing scheme is used. In this paper, we simply as-
sume that somehow a vMISO route has been set-up
with appropriate participation of honest and malicious
nodes. We do not consider attacks on route set-up or
discovery. We also ignore the medium access issues
in this paper. Modifications to the traditional request-
to-send (RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS) handshakes to
avoid collisions and hidden terminals are often used
[1] to accommodate cooperative transmissions. We do
not consider MAC layer attacks against such protocols
either in this paper.
2.2 Security threats against vMISO
Wireless ad hoc and sensor networks are vulnerable to
security attacks due to the shared nature of wireless
medium and the way they are deployed and their lim-
ited resources. Cooperative transmissions are more vul-
nerable to some security attacks than non-cooperative
(SISO) transmissions. This is because they aim to ex-
ploit the advantages of diversity, and this is achievable
only with multiple transmitters when each node has
only one antenna. Introducing additional parties to a
transmission increases the vulnerability to attacks. In
this section, we will give a brief explanation of potential
attacks. Our focus in the paper is less on the attacks
and this section only describes how attacks may be
employed. As explained previously, the focus of this
paper is on the impact especially in terms of when co-
operative transmissions should be used instead of SISO
transmissions. Consequently, irrespective of the cause
of the attack, we assume that the goal of a malicious
or a compromised node is to disrupt the successful
reception of packets either always or sometimes. Other
attacks mentioned in this section (e.g., eavesdropping
or wormhole attacks) are outside the scope of this
paper.
2.2.1 Disruption of packet transmission on vMISO links
In this section, we describe some ways in which cooper-
ative transmissions can be disrupted. Figure 2 shows a
classification of the attacks described here.
vMISO transmissions can exploit space-time diver-
sity by using relay nodes. A relay node must agree
to help a source node which has a data to send to a
destination node. When a relay node behaves self ishly
by not cooperating, a source node cannot exploit the
advantages of cooperative transmissions, and instead
it has to use SISO transmissions or transmissions with
fewer cooperating nodes. This may result in condi-
tions such as higher network-wide power consumption,
longer latency in transferring data and/or higher bit
error rates. A selfish node that agrees to cooperate but
then does not transmit the packet with the source and
other relays reduces the diversity and will likely result
in a packet not reaching the destination reliably (i.e.,
the packet will be dropped).
The number of relays is very important in cooper-
ative transmissions. Therefore, an attacker may try to
prevent a source node from choosing the right number
of relays for the cooperative transmission. If the source
assumes there will be n cooperative transmitters, but in
fact there are fewer than n transmitters, the packet will
not be successfully received at the intermediate or final
destination. If STBC is used as part of the cooperation
scheme, the cooperative transmission simply is not real-
ized since linearly combining the signals may not yield
the right decision variable or the diversity gain. If any
other uncoded cooperation scheme is used, given cer-
tain BER requirements, a source node cannot transmit
its data to the destination which is in the transmission
range if there are n nodes in the cooperation set, but
Fig. 2 A classification of attacks to disrupt cooperative
transmissions
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outside the range if there are m < n nodes. The ne-
cessity of symmetric links in cooperative transmissions
can add another problem to the mix. For a symmetric
cooperative link between source and destination nodes,
they both must have at least the same number of relays.
Thus, if a source node has n relays, the destination must
also have at least n relays. So it is possible for a source
node to pick an intermediate destination that claims to
have n cooperating relays even if it is a node with which
it shares no keys instead of a node that it shares a key
with, but which has fewer than n relays. Sybil attacks
are good examples for possibilities of this kind of an
attack. For instance, a Sybil node can claim more than
one identity, which will cause the source node to believe
that it has n relays, while in reality it has m < n relays.
With a routing algorithm where the routing metric
favors nodes with higher numbers of relays, a malicious
node may try to convince others that it has a higher
number of relays in its neighborhood or that other
nodes have fewer relays. This way it may attract traffic
to itself which then never reaches the destination.
An attacker can jam the channel during the trans-
mission of pilot tones that are often needed with co-
operative transmissions in order to prevent successful
estimation of CSI at the receiver. In such a case, the re-
ceiver cannot decode symbols successfully. Selectively
jamming some transmissions will also damage packets
at the receiver. In addition, control packet corruption
attacks are possible that allow a malicious node to
disrupt the successful reception of a packet.
In this paper, we only consider those attacks where
the attacker is part of the cooperative transmissions.
We do not consider the precise nature of the attack. For
example, the attacker could be a Sybil node or a selfish
node. The result in either case is that the packet will not
be successfully delivered. We do not consider jamming
or extraneous attacks such as the ones described below.
2.2.2 Other attacks
One of the advantages of cooperative diversity is the
increased transmission range with the same BER re-
quirement and power consumption as SISO transmis-
sions. However, this causes a single hop cooperative
transmission to have wider reception and interference
ranges when compared to those of SISO transmissions.
Therefore, cooperation has increased vulnerabilities in
terms of overhearing due to the larger transmission
range. This can facilitate rushing and wormhole attacks.
A wormhole attack may occur when a malicious node
captures a packet and replays it at another location. A
rushing attack may occur when a malicious node does
not wait for timers to timeout and replies before a le-
gitimate node. Obviously, the chances that a malicious
node can overhear a cooperative transmission is higher.
In addition, cooperative transmissions often require
a more complex MAC algorithm [1] which requires
exchanging more messages than needed for a direct
transmission. This also increases the probability of at-
tacks that are related to packet capturing. Methods that
narrow down the transmission area without decreasing
transmission range in the desired direction, i.e., using
directional antennas, may be useful.
Cooperative jamming is a method to protect against
eavesdropping which introduces noise into the commu-
nication medium to hurt the eavesdropper (untrusted
relay) more than the legitimate destination. An exam-
ple of such a solution to mitigate the eavesdroppers
in the transmission range is given in [8], where an op-
portunistic selection of two relay nodes is proposed to
increase security against eavesdroppers. The first relay
operates as a conventional node and assists a source
to deliver its data to a destination via the Decode-and-
Forward strategy [9]. The second relay is used in order
to create intentional interference at the eavesdropping
nodes. The proposed selection technique jointly pro-
tects the primary destination against interference and
jams the reception at the eavesdropper. This assumes
knowledge of the existence of the eavesdropper. In [10],
the authors show that a positive secrecy rate can be
achieved with the help of destination node or an exter-
nal node that jams the relay by cooperative jamming.
Resource draining attacks aim to reduce or deplete
the network’s resources such as the battery power of
nodes and the capacity of the network, etc. A malicious
node that is involved in a cooperative transmission
can attack the transmission to drain the batteries of
honest nodes, or occupy links by sending garbage data
for a longer time to decrease the capacity of the net-
work. Relay discovery attacks that request repeated
responses for discovering potential relay nodes may
result in high numbers of retransmissions which will
drain the batteries of nodes and reduce the lifetime
of the network. As mentioned before, the nodes that
reside in the wider transmission range of a cooperation
set (set of nodes cooperating) have to wait (to avoid
collisions) to be able to send their own data. In a non-
cooperative transmission, a simple 4-way handshake is
often enough to contend for the channel; in the vMISO
case, however, transmission latency increases due to
the message exchanging phase at the source and des-
tination clusters before cooperative control packets are
sent; also coding and decoding of symbols at the source
and destination may add to the latency. Therefore,
retransmissions must be as few as possible to have a
longer network lifetime.
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In [11], two types of resource draining attacks are
addressed. In “inside” attacks, malicious nodes send
garbage information to the destination when they serve
as relays. In bad mouthing attacks, a malicious node
needs to report the link quality or trust values. The
malicious node can lie and report false information. To
mitigate both attacks in addition to selfish behavior,
[11] proposed a distributed trust-assisted cooperative
transmission scheme. Trust values are constructed to
determine the link quality between cooperating nodes
and the destination node. Relayed transmissions are
combined at the destination according to the trust val-
ues.
Injecting traffic attacks are addressed in [12]. These
attacks occur when attackers inject an overwhelm-
ing amount of traffic into the network to consume
valuable network resources of honest nodes and to
reduce the network’s lifetime. In cooperative mobile
ad hoc networks, nodes will usually unconditionally
forward packets for other nodes. Consequently, such
networks are extremely vulnerable to injecting traffic
attacks, especially those launched by inside attackers.
In [12], two types of injecting traffic attacks that can
be launched in cooperative ad hoc networks are men-
tioned: query flooding attack and injecting data packet
attack (IDPA). Fortunately, in cooperative ad hoc net-
works, since nodes belong to the same authority and
pursue common goals, it is possible that they can know
each other’s data packet injection statistics. According
to the solution proposed in [12], detecting injecting
traffic attacks is equivalent to detecting those nodes
that are not legitimate but still they inject packets into
the network or whose packet injection rates are much
higher than their legitimate upper bounds. Also, legit-
imate nodes add a header to their packets along with
a digital signature. The maximum number of allowed
hops and signatures in the headers are used by honest
nodes in order to decide if there exists a malicious node
on the route and whether or not to forward a packet to
the next hop.
2.3 Key pre-distribution in sensor networks
One of the problems in the security of sensor net-
works is that the nodes cannot store a lot of keys.
Thus pairwise key installation and management is not
possible. At the same time, it is not wise to use a
single key that every node shares, as a single node
compromise can disrupt the whole network. To address
this problem, in [13], a key management mechanism is
proposed, and it has three phases: key pre-distribution,
shared-key discovery, and path-key establishment. The
key-pre-distribution phase is an offline phase, where
a large pool of S keys are generated. A key ring is
generated from k keys that are randomly chosen from
this pool. Key identifiers for each key in the key ring are
loaded to a sensor node. In the shared-key discovery
phase, each node discovers its neighbors in communica-
tion range with which it shares key(s). Nodes discover
shared-keys by broadcasting the list of k key identifiers
of the keys on their key ring in clear text. After this
phase, a secure link exists between two nodes if they
share at least one key. The probability they share a key
depends on S and k. In path-key establishment phase,
a path-key is assigned to selected pairs of nodes in
wireless communication range that do not share a key
but are connected by two or more links at the end of
the shared-key discovery phase. The downside of this
random key distribution scheme is that the probability
that two nodes share a key can be small and path-key
establishment may require several nodes to participate.
In some cases, the path between two geographically
close nodes (in communication range) may involve
more than three other nodes.
The knowledge of the deployment of sensors [14]
may be used to improve the probability that two nodes
share a key to something close to 1. Multiple key pools
are used in this deployment based scheme as opposed
to the single global key pool S. Sensors are assumed
to be deployed in clusters or groups organized into a
grid. Each deployment group has its own associated
group key pool that is generated from the global key
pool. Keys from the global key pool are assigned to
group key pools in a way that the group key pools of
clusters that are geographically closer have a certain
number of common keys. However, if two clusters are
not neighbors, the group key pools do not share any
keys. Nodes that are very far apart are thus unlikely to
share any keys (and the expectation is that they do not
have to share keys).
In this paper, we make use of these key pre-
distribution approaches to increase the reliability of
SISO and vMISO transmissions in the presence of ma-
licious and/or compromised nodes as explained in the
following sections.
3 Framework for analyzing packet success with vMISO
and SISO transmissions
In this section, we describe an analytical framework
for evaluating the probability of successfully delivering
a packet with SISO and vMISO transmissions with
and without the presence of malicious nodes in the
system. First we describe the idea of “distance gain”
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with vMISO which we will employ in the framework
in ensuing sections.
3.1 Outage probability, transmission range, and
distance gain
Based on [2], we first derive here an expression for
the relationship between the outage probability, the
number of cooperating nodes, and the increase in trans-
mission range possible with vMISO. The outage prob-
ability is a metric of reliability that is easier to employ
compared to detailed physical layer parameters such as
modulation schemes and bit error rate versus signal-to-
noise ratio curves as we discuss here later.
We assume a narrow-band multi-path wireless chan-
nel with a coherence time much longer than the symbol
transmission time, so that the channel can be assumed
to be constant over multiple symbol durations. This
channel is modeled as a flat Rayleigh fading channel
with a path-loss exponent β. All nodes have omni-
directional antennas and emit signals at the same power
Pt. The large scale path-loss for a transmitter-receiver
distance of d is, Kd−β , where K is a constant that is
typically a function of λ, the wavelength. For a certain
packet transmission, each transmitted signal goes over
an independent Rayleigh fading channel and it is cor-
rupted by a zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN). Let α be a Rayleigh distributed random
variable with parameter σ = 1. We note here that |α|2
has an exponential distribution. Under Rayleigh fading
with SISO, the signal strength Ss = P0d−βs |α|2 at the
receiver is exponentially distributed, where P0 = Pt ×
K. Here ds is the distance between the SISO transmitter
and receiver.
Let αi for i = 1, 2, · · · , n be independent random
fading coefficients with Rayleigh-distributed magni-
tudes and uniform phases. We use these coefficients to-
ward determining the range improvement with vMISO.
If there are n cooperating transmitters i = 1, 2, · · · , n
in vMISO at distances di from the receiver, the sig-
nal strength Si of the signal from the i-th cooperating
node, at the receiver will be P0|αi|2d−βi . The overall
signal strength at the receiver due to the cooperative
transmission will be S = P0 ∑ni=1 |αi|2d−βi . If we make
the assumption that the di’s are very close (and this is
a reasonable assumption for mathematical tractability)
and equal to dv , the signal strength at the receiver
is Sv = P0d−βv ∑ni=1 |αi|2. Note that
∑n
i=1 |αi|2 has a χ2
distribution with 2n degrees of freedom.
The quality of the wireless link can be measured by
the instantaneous bit error rate (BER). It is well-known
that spatial diversity can help transmit with a lower
total energy per symbol, while satisfying the same BER
requirement [15]. However, an analysis involving BERs
must assume a certain modulation class and involves
complicated mathematical functions. For example, the
BER with a modulation scheme such as binary phase
shift keying is very different from that with a higher
level modulation scheme like quadrature amplitude
modulation with 64 levels. A more general way to cap-
ture the link quality is through the outage probability,
pout, defined as the probability that the instantaneous
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), SNRi, falls below a cer-
tain threshold. If the coherence time is greater than
the packet transmission time, the outage probability
is time-invariant for a given packet transmission. Let
us suppose that Sth is the minimum required signal
strength for correct decoding at the receiver for a target
outage probability pout (assuming that the AWGN does
not change with time). Then, the outage probability for
the random signal strength S at the receiver can be
calculated as follows:
pout = Pr
[
S ≤ Sth
]
(1)
For the same pout, SISO and vMISO will have
different transmission ranges as follows. For SISO, we
have:
pout = Pr
[
Ss ≤ Sth
]
= Pr [P0d−βs |α|2 ≤ Sth
]
= Pr
[
|α|2 ≤ Sthd
β
s
P0
]
(2)
⇒ dβs = F−1s (pout)
P0
Sth
(3)
and in the case of vMISO, we will have:
pout = Pr
[
Sv ≤ Sth
]
= Pr
[
P0d−βv
n∑
i=1
|αi|2 ≤ Sth
]
= Pr
[
n∑
i=1
|αi|2 ≤ Sthd
β
v
P0
]
(4)
⇒ dβv = F−1v (pout)
P0
Sth
(5)
where Fs(·) and Fv(·) are respectively the cumulative
exponential and χ2 (2n degrees of freedom) distribu-
tions previously mentioned. We have to determine the
inverses of these cumulative distributions to calculate
the transmission ranges. Thus, the gain in transmission
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range with vMISO for the same outage probability [2]
can be expressed as:
dv
ds
=
[
F−1v (pout)
F−1s (pout)
] 1
β
= Gn(pout, β) (6)
We note here that the gain in transmission range
depends upon three parameters namely (i) the number
of cooperating nodes n that appears as an argument
through the degrees of freedom of the χ2 distribution
(ii) the path-loss exponent β and (iii) the outage proba-
bility requirements pout. Each of these parameters has a
non-linear influence on the gain in transmission range.
We plot the range improvements to get some clarity on
this influence.
In Fig. 3, we show the gain in transmission range for
n = 4 cooperating users as a function of the path-loss
exponent β. We vary β from β = 2 which is in free-
space to β = 6 which can occur in some harsh indoor
environments. Clearly, the range gain is larger when the
outage probability pout requirements are more strin-
gent, which is the case where cooperative transmissions
provide the benefits of diversity. Further, the gain in
transmission range starts becoming less important as β
increases. In fact, for β > 4, the gains in transmission
range with vMISO are very close even as pout changes
by two orders of magnitude. In the numerical results
that we present later, we chose β = 3 in most cases for
this reason.
Figure 4 shows the variation of the gains in trans-
mission range with vMISO over SISO as a function
of the outage probability pout for different numbers
of cooperating nodes with path-loss exponent fixed at
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β = 3. Please note here that the x-axis in Fig. 4 has a
logarithmic scale. Again, we observe that the largest
benefits are for more stringent values of pout (i.e., for
pout = 0.001) and the range gains are larger for larger
n. However, the range gains have diminishing returns
as n increases.
3.2 Probability of success without malicious nodes
Having considered the improvements in transmission
range with vMISO over SISO we next consider an
analysis of the probability of successful reception of
a packet at the destination of a multi-hop route with
SISO and vMISO transmissions in a sensor network.
Initially we will assume a network without any mali-
cious or compromised nodes.
First, let us suppose that a source node wishes to
send a packet to a destination node at distance D using
only SISO transmissions. Let the minimum number of
hops from the source to the destination, given an outage
probability pout be Ks =
⌈
D
ds
⌉
. If there are no malicious
nodes in the network, the probability that a packet is
successfully received at the destination is equal to the
probability that the packet is successfully received on
every hop,
PSISOsuc = (1 − pout)Ks (7)
When vMISO transmissions with n cooperating
nodes at each hop are employed, the minimum number
of hops needed from the same source to the same
destination becomes Kv =
⌈
D
dv
⌉
=
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout,β)
⌉
≤ Ks. To
calculate the success probability with vMISO, we need
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to consider the SISO transmissions between source and
relay nodes in addition to the cooperative transmission
to the destination node in every hop of the multi-hop
vMISO route. Then, the success probability will be,
PvMISOsuc = (1 − pout)nKv (8)
We are in effect assuming the worst case with vMISO
by making the assumption that the SISO transmissions
from a source to its relay nodes also suffer the same
outage probability. It is possible that such SISO trans-
missions have a much lower outage because of the
smaller distances from the source to its relays.
Based on the two success probabilities PSISOsuc and
PvMISOsuc , we can make the following assertions:
Theorem 1 (vMISO reliability without malicious
nodes) With no malicious nodes in the network and
n cooperating nodes to transmit a data packet from
a source to a destination that is Ks SISO hops away,
vMISO has better transmission reliability than SISO if
Iv(n, pout, β) = n
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout,β)
⌉
− Ks < 0, given an outage
probability pout and path-loss exponent β.
Proof When we compare Eqs. 7 and 8, vMISO per-
forms better than SISO when,
PvMISOsuc > P
SISO
suc
⇒ (1 − pout)nKv > (1 − pout)Ks
nKv < Ks
⇒ Iv(n, pout, β) = n
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout, β)
⌉
− Ks < 0 (9)
unionsq
Theorem 1 says that the performance of vMISO
compared to SISO depends on β, n and pout. It is not
possible to simplify this further easily due to the ceiling
function used to calculate the number of hops. We
plot Iv = nKv − Ks in Fig. 5 to show n and pout values
for which vMISO is more reliable than SISO, Iv < 0
(from Theorem 1), when β = 3. From this figure, we
observe that for vMISO to perform better, in general
pout and n must be small. Also, as pout gets larger (say
from 0.001 to 0.1), n must be smaller for vMISO to be
better. When β = 4, the ranges of values for n and pout
for which vMISO is better is narrower than for β = 3.
Still, it is not unreasonable to employ as many as n = 5
cooperative nodes for vMISO transmissions and obtain
a higher reliability than SISO.
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3.3 Probability of success with malicious nodes
Next we consider the setup of routes between sources
and destinations in the network and the impact that
malicious nodes may have on the probability of success-
fully receiving a packet at the destination. We assume
that source and destination nodes are honest nodes and
any malicious node will participate in generating the
route with the idea of dropping or corrupting all data
packets for now. We relax this to account for dropping
only some data packets in a later section.
Let γ be the fraction of honest nodes in the network.
Without any means of verifying whether or not a node
in the network is malicious, the probability of picking
a malicious node on a route depends on 1 − γ . We
further let δs be the degree of a node (the number of
neighbors) in SISO range ds. Then, δs consists of both
honest nodes and malicious nodes
δs = δh + δm.
When there is no mechanism to verify a node’s trust-
worthiness, an honest node cannot differentiate be-
tween honest and malicious neighbors; therefore, the
fraction of honest nodes is γ = δh
δs
. For a forwarding
node to be on a “successful” route from a source to a
destination (i.e., packets are not lost due to malicious
activity), it should have at least 2 honest nodes in its
SISO range (the previous and the next node on route).
The probability that a source node chooses an honest
forwarding node f1 as the next hop node (from Fig. 1)
is γ , and the probability that f1 chooses another honest
node f2 (excluding the source node) will be 1 − δmδs−1 .
When δs >> 1, this second probability approaches γ =
δh
δs
. Similarly, if the density of nodes is high, and the
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fraction 1 − γ of malicious nodes is also high, for sim-
plicity, we can assume that this fraction does not change
when a few nodes are already picked to be on a route.
Essentially then, the probability of picking a malicious
node as an intermediate node is 1 − γ .
On a SISO route of length Ks hops, none of the Ks −
1 intermediate nodes (e.g., f1, f2, f3 in Fig. 1a) must be
malicious for the packet to be received successfully at
the destination. Thus we have,
PSISOsuc = (1 − pout)Ks × γ Ks−1 (10)
When vMISO transmissions with n cooperating nodes
are employed, the computation of success probability
is more complicated. This is because, in this case, each
forwarding node in vMISO range must be chosen from
the honest neighboring nodes, and in addition, each
cooperating relay in SISO range must be chosen from
the honest nodes. Let Pn be the probability that an
honest source node chooses n − 1 honest relay nodes in
its SISO range to cooperate with them in a single hop
vMISO. Then,
Pn =
(
δh
n − 1
)
(
δs
n − 1
) = γ ×
i=n−2∏
i=1
δh − i
δs − i . (11)
We note that Pn increases with increasing δh (and
correspondingly δs) although γ is constant. The reason
is that the probability of selecting n − 1 cooperating
relays in a larger range is higher than in a smaller range.
We analyze Pn for different ranges of n and δh while
keeping γ = δh/δs constant. There are three cases we
consider:
1. When δh → ∞ and δh >> n, Pn → γ (n−1).
2. When n = 2, Pn → γ .
3. When n → ∞, Pn → 0.
In Fig. 6, we show Pn and γ (n−1), its approximation,
for simplifying the analysis for various n. The obser-
vations from this figure validates the claim that the
approximation is very close to the exact value of Pn. For
small n, n < 10 the difference is less than 0.01, and as
n increases the error also increases. However, even for
n = 20, the error is less than 0.03. Also it is unlikely that
very large values of cooperating nodes n will turn out to
be better in terms of reliability even in the absence of
any malicious nodes.
In a multi-hop vMISO route of length Kv hops, there
exist Kv vMISO transmissions, and Kv − 1 forwarding
nodes. Then, the success probability is given as,
PvMISOsuc = (1 − pout)nKv × (Pn)Kv × γ (Kv−1) (12)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
δh
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
γ=0.999
 
 
P
n
, n=2
γ(n−1), n=2
P
n
, n=10
γ(n− 1), n=10
P
n
, n=20
γ(n− 1), n=20
Fig. 6 Pn approximation
This also includes the outage that is possible with SISO
transmissions that are necessary to initially transfer the
data packets to the cooperating relays. Based on these
probabilities, we can make the following assertion:
Theorem 2 (vMISO reliability with malicious nodes)
When there exist malicious nodes in the network, but
no mechanism exists to distinguish between them, using
vMISO with n cooperating nodes to transmit a data
packet from a source to destination at distance Ks SISO
hops has better transmission reliability if Iv(n, pout, β) =
n
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout,β)
⌉
< Ks given the same outage probability
requirement, pout and path loss exponent, β for all trans-
missions.
Proof To simplify the analysis, we can compare PvMISOsuc
and PSISOsuc (Eqs. 12 and 10) under three different cases:
1. First case: γ << 1 − pout: This condition is similar
to the case when there are no malicious nodes in
the network, since the terms including γ in Eqs. 10
and 12 can be neglected. Pn in Eq. 12 can also be
neglected since it is also a function of γ . Then, this
condition is in line with Theorem 1.
2. Second case: 1 − pout = γ and Pn ≈ γ (n−1): This
condition is possible when δh → ∞ and δh >> n
which results in Pn ≈ γ (n−1). Then Eqs. 10 and 12
can be re-written as,
PSISOsuc = γ 2Ks−1 (13)
PvMISOsuc = γ (2nKv−1) (14)
Then, comparing Eqs. 13 and 14, vMISO performs
better than SISO when Iv = nKv − Ks < 0.
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3. Third case: γ >> 1 − pout and Pn ≈ γ (n−1): Under
this condition, the (1 − pout) terms in Eqs. 10 and
12 can be neglected, and the success probabilities
can be re-written as,
PSISOsuc = γ Ks−1 (15)
PvMISOsuc = γ (nKv−1) (16)
When we compare Eqs. 15 and 16, vMISO per-
forms better than SISO if Iv = nKv − Ks < 0.
Note that in the presence of malicious nodes in the
network and without a mechanism (e.g., shared keys)
to identify malicious nodes, all three cases result in
the same condition Iv = nKv − Ks < 0 for a Kv hops
vMISO route to outperform a Ks hops SISO route
in terms of successful packet reception probability for
given β and pout.
From Theorems 1 and 2, we observe that the con-
dition for multi-hop vMISO to outperform multi-hop
SISO in terms of success probability in the presence of
malicious nodes and with no mechanism for distinguish-
ing between honest and malicious nodes, is the same
as the condition for multi-hop vMISO to outperform
multi-hop SISO when there are no malicious nodes
in the network. This observation is a result of the
approximation made in calculating Pn. Thus, the same
conclusions can be made as before, i.e., n must be fairly
small and pout must be stringent enough for vMISO to
be better.
3.4 Using partial trust with malicious nodes
In this section, we investigate the effect of employing
shared keys for trust between honest nodes in the
network. Depending on the type of key pre-distribution
scheme, it is likely that an honest node will share keys
with some of its neighbors, and not share any keys
with some of them. Furthermore, malicious nodes may
compromise keys of honest nodes in order to thwart the
trust mechanism utilized between honest nodes. The
key sharing mechanism for trust and the key compro-
mising probability of malicious nodes may affect what
we call “the degree” of a node. This degree refers to the
number of neighbors that a node trusts based on shared
keys, even though some of them may be malicious. Let
η be the probability that two honest nodes share at
least one common key and Pm be the probability that
an honest node shares a common key with a malicious
node in its SISO neighborhood. Then, “the degree” of
a node becomes
δ′s = δ′h + δ′m = ηδh + Pmδm.
We note that degree δ′s = δs when both key sharing
and key compromising probabilities are 1, η = Pm =
1. We analyze successful packet reception with multi-
hop SISO and multi-hop vMISO with two different
key pre-distribution schemes: deployment-based key
pre-distribution scheme [14], and random key pre-
distribution schemes [3]. The probability that a node
shares a common key with nodes in its neighborhood
is larger with the deployment based scheme [14] while
it is smaller with the random pre-distribution scheme
[3].
3.4.1 Using deployment-based scheme
In the case of deployment based schemes, a node may
share keys with its neighbors with high probability (η ≈
1, 0 < d ≤ ds), but not with nodes that are far away
(0 ≤ η < 1, d > ds). Assuming that an intermediate
node is not malicious, in such schemes, it is likely that
the complete route is safe. Then, the success probability
with SISO is only affected by the fraction of compro-
mised nodes Pm. Let the probability that an intermedi-
ate node in SISO range is honest be γs = δ
′
h
δ′s
= δh
δh+δm Pm
(η = 1 and δ′s >> 1). Then, the success probability on a
SISO route of length Ks hops is,
PSISOsuc = (1 − pout)Ks × γ Ks−1s (17)
In single-hop vMISO transmission, the probability
that a source node chooses n − 1 honest nodes out of
δ′s nodes in SISO range is,
P′n =
(
δ′h
n − 1
)
(
δ′s
n − 1
) =
i=n−2∏
i=0
δ′h − i
δ′s − i
. (18)
For multi-hop vMISO, the probability that an inter-
mediate node in vMISO range is honest depends on
η and will be γv = δ
′
h
δ′s
= ηδh
ηδh+δm Pm (0 ≤ η ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Pm ≤
1). Then, the success probability is,
PvMISOsuc = (1 − pout)nKv × (P′n)Kv × γ (Kv−1)v , (19)
where in the calculation of P′n, the key sharing proba-
bility is η = 1, whereas in the calculation of γv, the key
sharing probability may be 0 ≤ η ≤ 1.
Now the success probability depends on γs and γv
instead of only γ in addition to pout, n and β. Following
the second condition in the proof of Theorem 2, let
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γs = 1 − pout and P′n ≈ γ n−1s . When we compare Eqs.
17 and 19:
PvMISOsuc > P
SISO
suc
γ Kv(2n−1)s × γ (Kv−1)v > γ Ks−1s
γ (Kv−1)v > γ
Ks−1−Kv(2n−1)
s (20)
Equation 20 can be investigated under 3 different cases:
1. When η → 1, γv → γs; then, vMISO performs bet-
ter than SISO when Iv = nKv − Ks < 0 as in Theo-
rem 2.
2. When malicious nodes do not have the ability to
compromise the keys of honest nodes (Pm = 0),
γs = γv = 1 and P′n = 1, and the success probability
with SISO and vMISO are the same as Eqs. 7 and
8 (when there are no malicious nodes in the net-
work), respectively. Then, according to Theorem
1, vMISO is more efficient than SISO when Iv =
nKv − Ks < 0.
3. When Pm → η = 1 in SISO case, γs → γ ; there-
fore, the success probability (17) approaches Eq.
10. Similarly, in the vMISO case, when Pm → η,
γv → γ and P′n → Pn; therefore, Eq. 19 approaches
Eq. 12. We recall that Eqs. 10 and 12 are valid
when there is no trust mechanism in the presence
of malicious nodes in the network. This is expected
when Pm = η, because the trust mechanism cannot
differentiate between malicious and honest nodes.
Table 1 summarizes the values appropriate for η
and Pm when deployment based key predistribution is
used to trust nodes with and without the presence of
compromised nodes.
3.4.2 Using random key pre-distribution
In the case of random key pre-distribution schemes,
a node shares keys with its neighbors and with nodes
that are far away with equal probability (0 ≤ η ≤ 1).
Therefore, the success probability of SISO is affected
by both key sharing probability of honest nodes, η, and
the fraction of compromised nodes, Pm. The success
probability with SISO is given in Eq. 17 where the
Table 1 Deployment based key predistribution
0 < d ≤ ds ds < d ≤ dv
No compromised nodes η 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
(Eqs. 7 and 8) Pm 0 0
With compromised nodes η 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
(Eqs. 17 and 19) Pm 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1
probability that an intermediate node in SISO range is
honest is calculated from
γs = δ
′
h
δ′s
= δhη
δhη + δm Pm .
Similarly, in the case of vMISO, P′n and γv are calcu-
lated with given 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, and the success probability
is given in Eq. 19. Therefore, we can again use Eq. 20
for analysis:
1. With random key pre-distribution schemes, γs =
γv . Assuming P′n ≈ γ n−1s , vMISO is more efficient
if Iv = nKv − Ks < 0.
2. With no compromised nodes Pm = 0, γs = γv = 1
and P′n = 1. Then, following the same analogy as
in the case with deployment based schemes, The-
orem 2 is valid when random key pre-distribution
schemes are employed.
3. When Pm → η, γs → γ and γv → γ ; therefore, the
success probability (17) approaches Eq. 10, and
Eq. 19 approaches Eq. 12. Therefore, Theorem 1
is valid when random key pre-distribution schemes
are employed.
Table 2 summarizes the values appropriate for η and
Pm when random key pre-distribution based scheme is
used.
3.5 Partial packet dropping by malicious nodes
It is possible that malicious nodes do not always drop
or corrupt the data packet transmission, but do so
only with a probability 1 − p f in order to avoid quick
detection by honest nodes. We evaluate this scenario in
this section.
We can account for the partial dropping of data
packets by changing the degree of honest and malicious
nodes from that in Section 3.3 as
δs = δh + δm = δh + δmf + δmp,
where δmf = p f δm is the fraction of malicious nodes
that will correctly forward packets at a given time. The
probability that an honest forwarding node is selected
should now include the malicious nodes that will cor-
rectly forward packets.
Table 2 Random key pre-distribution
0 < d ≤ ds ds < d ≤ dv
Without compromised nodes η 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
(Eqs. 7 and 8) Pm 0 0
With compromised nodes η 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
(Eqs. 17 and 19) Pm 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1
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When no key pre-distribution scheme is employed,
the presence of malicious nodes that selectively forward
data packets changes the success probabilities as fol-
lows. With SISO transmissions on a multi-hop route,
the success probability remains the same as in Eq. 10
with the following change: γ = δh+δmf
δs
instead of γ =
δh
δs
to account for additional nodes that will correctly
forward data packets. Let γ f = δmfδs . With vMISO trans-
missions, in addition to the change in γ the probability
of a source choosing n − 1 honest relay nodes in SISO
range, Pn in Eq. 12 changes to:
Pn =
min(n−1,δmf )∑
m=0
(
δmf
m
)
(
δs
m
)
(
δh
n − m − 1
)
(
δs
n − m − 1
)
=
min(n−1,δmf )∑
m=0
γ m−1f × γ n−m−1 (21)
since the n − 1 relays can come from the set of honest
neighbors or malicious neighbors that will correctly
forward packets.
Similarly, with the key pre-distribution schemes, we
have to make the following modifications. In Eq. 17,
we have to use γs = δ
′
h+δ′mf
δ′s
where δ′s = δ′h + δ′m as before
but δ′mf = Pm p f δm is the number of malicious nodes in
the neighborhood that will correctly forward packets
and also share a key with an honest node (i.e., they
are compromised, yet do not wish to be detected).
Equation 18 will have to be modified to account for
such nodes as well when a vMISO transmission takes
place and this modification is similar to that in Eq. 21
since the relays can now be picked from two different
sets. Thus in Eq. 19, we have to use both the modified
γs and the modified P′n. Finally, the modified γs has to
be employed with random key pre-distribution as well.
4 Numerical results
4.1 Success probability without malicious nodes
Figure 7 shows the probability of success with SISO
and vMISO transmissions with respect to n and Ks
when β = 3 and pout = 10−3. While increasing Ks, ds
is kept the same; therefore, increasing Ks also means
increasing the source-destination distance D and the
number of vMISO hops Kv . We observe that PvMISOsuc
is sometimes flat for several SISO hops. This is because
the same number of cooperating nodes suffice for cov-
ering a few SISO hops. We also see that a smaller num-
ber n of cooperating nodes is better when D is small
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enough to be covered by a smaller number of SISO
hops. However, a larger number of cooperating nodes
may outperform SISO when the number of SISO hops
is large (larger D). A similar behavior is observed also
in Figs. 8 and 9, where success probabilities with SISO
and vMISO are shown for different values of β and pout.
This behavior was previously explained in Theorem 1.
From these figures, the success probabilities for vMISO
are reduced with higher pout and β. We also observe
a reduction in the number of cooperating nodes for
vMISO to be more efficient than SISO with larger β
although pout is kept the same.
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4.2 Success probability with malicious nodes
In Fig. 10, we show PSISOsuc and P
vMISO
suc for various
values of Ks and n using Eqs. 13 and 14. We have
picked pout = 1 − γ = 10−3, and used β = 3 which pro-
vides moderate distance gains with cooperative trans-
missions. Also, a high number of honest node degree is
assumed δh = 200 >> 1 for approximating Pn ≈ γ n−1.
When compared to Fig. 7, SISO and vMISO success
probabilities decreased approximately by a factor of
γ Ks−1 and γ nKv−1, respectively. We emphasize that
since pout and β are the same for both cases, the relation
between performance comparison are the same for
both cases, Iv = nKv − Ks > 0 for n and Ks for higher
vMISO success probability.
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In Fig. 11, Psuc with SISO and vMISO are given
for β = 3, γ = 1 − pout = 0.999. We pick the distance
between the source and the destination nodes as Ks =
30 hops to create a scenario to compare the results with
δh = 200 and δh = 50. We observe that the approxima-
tion Pn ≈ γ n−1 provides a success probability which is
very close to its actual value. Another observation is
that with larger pout, the number of cooperating nodes
must be small n < 5 for vMISO to be better.
4.3 Success probability with key pre-distribution
schemes
Figures 12 and 13 show the success probabilities when
deployment based scheme is employed with pout = 1 −
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γ = 0.001. We picked Pm = 0.2, and η = 0.5 for d > ds
in the calculation of Psuc with vMISO. The observation
is similar to the one seen in Fig. 10. In Fig. 13, we
plot Psuc with different η and Pm values when Ks =
30 hops and δh = 50. When η = 0.5 and Pm = 0.5, an
honest node cannot communicate with half of the nodes
that reside in its transmission range, and it considers
half of the malicious nodes in the neighborhood as
honest nodes. Therefore, this case has a lower success
probability compared to those achieved with η = 0.5
and Pm = 0.2 and η = 0.9 and Pm = 0.2.
Exactly the same scenario was created with ran-
dom key pre-distribution, and the results are shown
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Fig. 15 Psuc versus n with deployment based key predistribution,
β = 3, pout = 0.001 for various correctly forwarding probabilities
by malicious nodes
in Fig. 14. When η = 0.5 and Pm = 0.5, the success
probabilities are lower than those with deployment
based scheme due to the reduction in “presumably
honest node degree” in SISO range with random key
pre-distribution. The highest success probabilities for
given parameters are achieved when η = 0.9 and Pm =
0.2 as expected. We also see that the best number of
cooperating nodes is n = 4 for the scenario considered
in Figs. 13 and 14. When n = 4, Gn(pout, β) = 7.5381
and Iv = nKv − Ks = −14 < 0.
Fig. 16 Psuc versus n with deployment based key predistribution,
β = 3, pout = 0.01 for various correctly forwarding probabilities
by malicious nodes
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Fig. 17 Psuc versus n with random based key predistribution, β =
3, pout = 0.001 for various correctly forwarding probabilities by
malicious nodes
4.4 Success probabilities with partial packet dropping
To understand to what degree the success probabilities
are impacted by malicious nodes correctly forwarding
data packets selectively, we show the results with de-
ployment based key pre-distribution in Fig. 15 with
pout = 0.001 and Fig. 16 with pout = 0.01. Clearly, as
p f increases, the success rate also increases with both
SISO. However, with vMISO, an increase in p f does
not significantly change the success probabilities. More-
over, the observations are similar when pout changes
from 0.001 to 0.01, although the overall success proba-
Fig. 18 Psuc versus n with random based key predistribution,
β = 3, pout = 0.01 for various correctly forwarding probabilities
by malicious nodes
bilities are lower as expected. Any improvement in the
success probabilities with vMISO occurs only when the
number of cooperating nodes is small. This is because
it takes only one malicious cooperating node to disrupt
the successful delivery of a packet over the link (and
this is quite likely even with malicious nodes correctly
forwarding packets some of the time) as the number
of cooperating nodes increases. In the case of SISO
transmissions, only one node is used on every link and
so there is some improvement in the probability of
successfully delivering the packet. We also computed
results with δh = 200 and there were no significant
differences.
The results with random key pre-distribution for the
same settings are shown in Figs. 17 and 18. The success
probabilities with SISO show slightly larger improve-
ments when malicious nodes selectively forward data
packets correctly, but the other trends are similar.
5 Conclusions
Cooperative transmissions exploit a fundamental fea-
ture of the wireless medium: the ability to achieve
diversity through independent channels created be-
tween the multiple transmitters and the receiver, be-
cause these channels are likely to fade independently.
With more relay nodes, a higher order of diversity can
be achieved improving the BER and/or transmission
range. However, at the same time, cooperative trans-
missions suffer from drawbacks from a security point of
view due to the involvement of additional parties to the
communication. In this paper, we evaluate the tradeoffs
between using cooperative transmissions or not for
reliable transmission of packets in sensor networks with
a mix of honest and malicious nodes. We showed that
when the number of honest nodes in the neighborhood
of a node is much higher than the number of coop-
erating nodes (n), at high outage probability, vMISO
with small n outperforms SISO in terms of successful
transmission probability. We also derived a general
condition (under simplifying approximations) for all
cases where vMISO outperforms SISO.
As mentioned in the paper, we do not explicitly
account for protocol effects in this paper which may
change some of the conclusions as to when vMISO
outperforms SISO. Accounting for protocol effects and
comparing the analytical results with protocol effects
with simulations is part of our future work.
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